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1 **More than CO<sub>2</sub>: A broader paradigm for managing climate change and variability to**  
2 **avoid ecosystem collapse**

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1 **Abstract:** Climate change policies currently focus on reducing the concentration of industrial  
2 atmospheric greenhouse gases due to burning fossil fuels and deforestation, but pay limited  
3 attention to feedbacks between the land surface and the climate system. In tropical and sub-  
4 tropical regions, forests and woodlands play an important role in the climate system by  
5 buffering climate extremes, maintaining the hydrological cycle and sequestering carbon.  
6 Despite the obvious significance of these feedbacks to the functioning of the climate system,  
7 deforestation continues apace. It is critical, therefore, that a broader focus be developed that  
8 includes the restoration of feedbacks between vegetation and climate. In this paper, we  
9 present a synthesis of the best available, policy-relevant science on the feedbacks between  
10 the land surface and the climate system, with a focus on tropical and sub-tropical regions.  
11 Based on this science, we argue for a stronger integration of land-use and climate-change  
12 policies. These policies need to include a virtual halt to all deforestation and an acceleration  
13 of investment in strategic reforestation, supported by a comprehensive global forest  
14 monitoring program. Without these actions, the degradation of the Earth's ecosystems will  
15 become exacerbated as their resilience is eroded by accelerated changes in temperature,  
16 precipitation and extreme weather events.

17  
18 **KEYWORDS:** complex systems; clean development mechanism (CDM), climate feedbacks;  
19 climate policy; land use/land cover change, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); reduced  
20 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).

21

## 1 Introduction

2 There is a global recognition for strong and urgent policy actions to prevent atmospheric  
3 concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub>, due to the burning of industrial fossil fuels and deforestation, from  
4 rising much above their present levels [1, \*2, 3]. Despite the hopeful expectations of a  
5 concerned global population, the 15<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen  
6 made very modest progress towards reducing concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere and  
7 addressing issues of deforestation and forest degradation, particularly in developing  
8 countries. The failure to secure a binding global agreement at COP15 means further  
9 negotiations are required before real, quantifiable, progress can be achieved to “stabilise  
10 greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous  
11 anthropogenic interference with the climate system” [4].

12  
13 Even if effective global action on mitigating greenhouse-driven climate change is  
14 forthcoming, communities may still be grappling with adverse changes to climate precisely  
15 because policy makers remain overwhelmingly focused on CO<sub>2</sub> reductions and continue to  
16 ignore other anthropogenic modifiers of climate systems. To date, climate models such as  
17 those used for the 4AR of the IPCC have failed to adequately capture the full range of  
18 human-influenced climate forcings impacting the climate system, [4, \*\*5, 6]. This has  
19 resulted in an emphasis on industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in climate policy frameworks, and much  
20 less emphasis on other human-influenced climate forcings.

21  
22 In reality, there is a range of human-influenced climate forcings, including changing  
23 concentrations of industrial anthropogenic greenhouse gases, stratospheric ozone depletion,  
24 changes in atmospheric aerosol loadings and deposition, and biophysical feedbacks of land  
25 use/land cover change (LUCC) on the Earth’s climate [3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The Earth’s climate

1 behaves as a complex adaptive system, continually responding to numerous forcings and  
2 feedbacks across a range of spatial and temporal scales [11, 12]. The climate system is highly  
3 nonlinear: inputs and outputs are not proportional, and change is often episodic and abrupt,  
4 rather than slow and gradual [13]. Even if humans find ways to reverse the rapid progress of  
5 climate change through technology, it may be impossible to revert to historical climates due  
6 to inertia in the climate system and ongoing LUCC.

8 A number of studies point toward the links between historical LUCC and concurrent changes  
9 in climate across many regions of the Earth [\*14, \*15, \*16, 17, 18, \*\*19, 20, 21].

10 Contemporary LUCC is likely to generate further changes in climate and ecosystem  
11 functioning, as there is a considerable time lag between the responses of ecosystems to  
12 climate change [22]. Forests and woodlands around the world are known to play a significant  
13 role in moderating climate variability and climate change, conserving biodiversity and  
14 providing essential ecosystem services [18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. Yet, deforestation is  
15 continuing at alarming rates in many tropical and sub-tropical regions. Between 1996 and  
16 2009, Brazil deforested an average of ~17,000 km<sup>2</sup> annually, while Indonesia deforested  
17 ~20,000 km<sup>2</sup> [29].

19 The aim of this paper is to highlight the need to broaden the current paradigm for managing  
20 climate change and variability to include feedbacks between the land surface and the climate  
21 system. First, we provide a short synthesis of impacts of LUCC on the climate, and the  
22 vulnerability of terrestrial ecosystems and society to these impacts, followed by a synthesis of  
23 current international climate policy mechanisms and their capacity to mitigate the adverse  
24 impacts of LUCC on climate. Finally, we identify a set of priority actions for including land-  
25 atmosphere forcings and feedbacks in regional and global climate change policies.

1

## 2 **How forest and woodland clearing affects climate**

3 By the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, approximately 35% of Earth's terrestrial ecosystems had  
4 already been converted to cropland, pasture and urban land uses [30, 31]. These conversions  
5 resulted in decreased moisture recycling at scales of the landscape and biosphere [32, 33],  
6 and a diminished capacity for landscapes to buffer extreme weather events, increasing  
7 climate variability and climate change [\*\*34]. Most intact native forests and woodlands  
8 provide essential links between climate and water, energy and carbon cycles, but this is  
9 especially true for tropical regions [35]. These forests recycle large volumes of water vapour  
10 between the land surface and the lower atmosphere [33], which is a positive feedback to the  
11 generation of further precipitation [36]. Forests and woodlands also reduce sensible heat flux  
12 and contribute to increased atmospheric instability and convection that leads to the formation  
13 of clouds, which are important mechanisms for buffering climatic extremes [Figure 1; 37, 38,  
14 39]. For example, dense cloud cover reflects significant amounts of long-wave radiation back  
15 into space, a process that regulates local surface temperatures [\*\*34, \*40]. Tropical forests  
16 have a much higher leaf area index than perennial crops and pastures, and this (along with  
17 their deep roots) promotes the transpiration of water vapour and subsequent cloud  
18 development. In Amazonia and other forest ecosystems, volatile organic compounds emitted  
19 by the forest provide cloud-condensation nuclei that are key elements in cloud formation [41,  
20 \*42].

21

22 [Figure 1 approx here]

23

24 In sub-tropical regions, native forests and woodlands also play a major role in enhancing the  
25 hydrological cycle and moderating temperatures and climate extremes [\*14, \*\*19, 43, \*44].

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1 The wet phase of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle triggers periodic resource  
2 recovery and renewal processes for many sub-tropical ecosystems. Across Australia, for  
3 example, ‘La Niña’ (wet phase) events are linked to periods of above-average rainfall that  
4 allow ecosystems to regenerate following drought [45]. However, if climate change amplifies  
5 and increases the frequency of extreme temperatures and droughts, there is a real danger that  
6 native forests and woodlands may begin to lose their auto-regenerative capacities. These  
7 changes would then reduce an ecosystem’s resilience to climate extremes and increase the  
8 risk of resource degradation and ecosystem collapse [\*44, 46, 47, \*48].

## 10 **Risks and vulnerability**

11 Terrestrial ecosystems and the climate system are closely coupled, with multiple interactions  
12 and feedbacks occurring across a range of scales [7, 34, 47]. This is because the Earth and its  
13 ecosystems are organised as complex adaptive systems, where feedbacks between a large  
14 number of components maintain ecological functioning despite continual variance in inputs  
15 (e.g. solar radiation, rainfall). Small perturbations to these systems can cause much greater  
16 changes than the perturbation itself would suggest. Perturbations are also often non-linear,  
17 meaning that changes may be abrupt or take decades to manifest themselves. This means that  
18 the Earth has numerous possible future pathways depending on the type and timing of land  
19 use changes and climate change mitigation actions undertaken decades prior (Figure 2). As  
20 the climate shifts, feedbacks may become impaired, modified or destroyed, further weakening  
21 ecosystem resilience (Figure 2, path ‘A’). In addition, dramatic shifts in and/or collapse of the  
22 hydrological cycle and ecosystem services in many regions may still occur based purely on  
23 the historical legacy of LUCC and emissions (Figure 2, path ‘B’). To maximise options  
24 available to manage complex climatic and landscape systems alike, we must define and act  
25 on ‘leverage points’ that result in major change for small input (Figure 2, path ‘C’). Timely



1 intervention can create a future where LUCC and climate change is managed for resilience  
2 (t1), whereas the same change a decade later may have little benefit (t2). Alternatively, if we,  
3 as a global society, wait for the more severe impacts of climate change to occur, then extreme  
4 shifts in climate and wide-spread ecosystem collapse are assured.

5  
6 It is critical that clearing of native forests and woodlands in tropical and sub-tropical regions  
7 be dramatically reduced, as these ecosystems have a significant capacity to sequester carbon  
8 and also underpin the hydrological cycle. Tropical forests absorb about 18% of all carbon  
9 dioxide added by fossil fuels, annually processing about six times as much carbon via  
10 photosynthesis and respiration as humans emit from fossil fuel use [11, 49, 50]. If society  
11 fails to act soon, severe shifts in ecosystem functioning as a result of changes to the climate  
12 system due to human and natural climate forcings may mean that the narrow window of  
13 opportunity to use the regenerative capabilities of native forests and woodlands is lost.  
14 Likewise, it is almost impossible to plant forests over such vast areas and to expect them to  
15 survive under continually drying conditions. These factors make it imperative that policy  
16 actions prevent further large-scale or ad-hoc deforestation in all biomes (not only carbon-rich  
17 tropical forests) and provide for the strategic, broad-scale restoration of forests and  
18 woodlands in addition to reducing industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Due to the inertia in the climate  
19 system, these actions must be implemented decades before 2050 changes begin to manifest  
20 (Figure 2, path 'C'). The year 2050 has been identified by a number of studies as an  
21 approximate date by which continued business-as-usual emissions would provoke  
22 catastrophic impacts, such as Amazon forest collapse [51].

23  
24 [Figure 2 approx here]

## 1 **Current policy mechanisms**

2

### 3 *LULUCF*

4 The policy framework that has evolved to address the challenges posed by greenhouse-driven  
5 climate change has established carbon as the standard of exchange in a market designed to  
6 achieve specific outcomes: reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions and increase in sustainable  
7 development. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) is estimated to account for  
8 between 12% and 28% of the global emissions inventory, although there are considerable  
9 uncertainties in measurement [62]. The inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of LULUCF in  
10 national emissions accounting has meant that agriculture, forestry and deforestation are  
11 integral components of carbon inventories, yet there has been little success in using the  
12 LULUCF sector to achieve the goals of the UNFCCC. Policy instruments have mainly  
13 engineered improved industrial processes, energy efficiency and investments in alternative  
14 energy generation technologies [52] because sustainability has been interpreted as  
15 technological and developmental progress. When sustainable development is interpreted in  
16 terms of poverty alleviation, ecological restoration, social equity and community  
17 development, international climate policy mechanisms are widely considered to have made  
18 minimal contributions [\*53, 54, 55]. Land surface-atmosphere processes have been largely  
19 excluded from the financial accounting of climate policy processes, in much the same way as  
20 sustainability outcomes. The narrow definitions of climate policy instruments, and the  
21 market-based approaches employed as mitigation and adaptation strategies, are failing to  
22 achieve their larger goals [56]. Other mechanisms beyond the Protocol continue to be  
23 debated.

### 24 *Clean Development Mechanism*

1 The clean development mechanism, or CDM, is the principal source of carbon-emissions  
2 offsets for firms in developed countries, with more than 2600 registered projects at the end of  
3 June 2009, around 4000 more in the CDM “pipeline” [57], and more than US\$6.5 billion in  
4 project-based transactions in 2008 [58]. However, the CDM has a questionable history in the  
5 Kyoto Protocol’s 2008-2012 First Commitment Period, with much of the credit granted  
6 having no real benefit for climate [53, 59, 60]. The distribution of CDM project activities is  
7 also extremely uneven, with the overwhelming majority of projects occurring in China and  
8 India, and currently less than 2% in Africa [57].  
9  
10 CDM projects can be developed in any of 15 “sectoral scopes”, ranging from energy  
11 production (renewable and non-renewable) to agriculture. Forestry is one of these sectoral  
12 scopes, and CDM projects can generate carbon credits known as certified emission reductions  
13 (CERs) – which are tradeable commodities in the international carbon markets – through  
14 afforestation or reforestation of areas cleared prior to 1990 [61]. Notwithstanding efforts to  
15 encourage afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM, land use, land-use  
16 change and forestry currently play a negligible role in the global carbon market. Afforestation  
17 and reforestation projects currently represent less than 1% of all projects in the CDM  
18 pipeline, with only 16 registered as of June 2010. While there are numerous constraints that  
19 affect the development of forestry-related CDM projects, it is clear that the sector is under-  
20 represented. LUCC is also not addressed within the agriculture sectoral scope of the CDM.  
21 There were 127 projects registered using agricultural methodologies: these involved methane  
22 capture or recovery or animal waste management, with some biomass-based power  
23 generation [57]. The paucity of land use-based CDM methodologies, as well as the highly  
24 uneven distribution of project activities, ensures that the mechanism makes little if any  
25 contribution to the impact of LUCC on global climate.

1

2 *REDD*

3 Land cover change in the form of deforestation and forest degradation is recognised as a  
4 major contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. Mechanisms that seek to reduce  
5 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), particularly in tropical  
6 countries where forest carbon pools are large [63], are therefore attractive. REDD  
7 mechanisms offer a range of desirable ancillary benefits including the protection of habitat  
8 for biodiversity, production of food, regulation of local climate forcings and feedbacks,  
9 nutrient cycling and pollination. At the same time, REDD and other land use-based carbon  
10 management systems can contribute to building the adaptive capacities of communities  
11 affected by the impacts of climate change by securing ecosystem services into the future.  
12 These co-benefits benefits are recognised in the term “REDD-plus”.

13

14 Simply put, management of land use and land cover in the context of carbon markets  
15 represents a comprehensive response to climate change and an integrated approach to  
16 achieving sustainable development. Yet while these approaches have generally been  
17 considered as cost-effective methods of achieving emission reductions [64, \*65], it is  
18 increasingly clear that the complexities inherent in such schemes render REDD and other  
19 forms of payment for environmental services extremely difficult to implement. In addition,  
20 there is growing recognition of a wider range of economic, social and political costs  
21 associated with REDD [\*\*66], and a number of challenges remain to be addressed.

22

23 International discussions on REDD policy mechanisms have been ongoing since the Kyoto  
24 Protocol was signed in 1997. At the 11<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties (COP11) in 2005, the  
25 UNFCCC began a program of work to develop policy mechanisms and incentives for REDD.

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1 At COP13 in 2007, a number of countries advocated the inclusion of conservation activities  
2 in a REDD mechanism, but this was opposed by powerful players including the European  
3 Union and Brazil. The concern these countries expressed publicly was that such inclusions  
4 would create large amounts of “hot air” credits and effectively flood the carbon market,  
5 removing incentives for further conservation elsewhere. The uncertainty over the exact  
6 determination of eligible activities remains unresolved, although there was general agreement  
7 at COP15 in Copenhagen that REDD mechanisms need to be further developed to include the  
8 ancillary benefits mentioned previously under the rubric of REDD-plus [61, 67].

9  
10 An issue that remains somewhat intractable is the question of funding for REDD, which  
11 derives either from public funds or market mechanisms [\*\*68]. Different countries support  
12 different approaches, ranging from taxes and levies on joint implementation transactions to  
13 international-level financing through the World Bank and governments. Yet the funds that  
14 have been established has so far failed to secure major investment, with total commitments  
15 and contributions not more than US\$1 billion to date [69, 70]. This suggests that regulated  
16 markets may be far more effective in funding REDD and REDD-plus mechanisms than  
17 voluntary systems. The key feature of market mechanisms is that they create incentives and  
18 drive innovation. In contrast, top-down regulatory approaches in the form of taxation or  
19 levies are difficult to manage and harder to enforce; no international authority capable of  
20 imposing such a fiscal regime currently exists.

21  
22 The Copenhagen Accord recognises the critical role of reducing emissions from deforestation  
23 and forest degradation and the need to enhance the removal of greenhouse gases by forests.  
24 The Accord proposes to provide financial resources to facilitate REDD-plus, as well as  
25 adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building. Developed countries have collectively

1 committed to financing close to US\$30 billion for the period 2010 – 2012, with a further goal  
2 of mobilising US\$100 billion a year by 2020 to support mitigation and adaptation in  
3 developing countries [61]. However, even if this funding is forthcoming, it is imperative to  
4 develop policy approaches that can overcome the technical and institutional constraints on  
5 REDD-plus, and market mechanisms are the most efficient tools to achieve these outcomes.  
6 Only regulated markets with strong and equitable governance will provide sufficient finance  
7 on a scale that delivers effective outcomes for forests and the people who depend on these  
8 forests [71]. Future climate negotiations need to strengthen REDD-plus to deal with this  
9 problem, as well as considering other ways to reduce the human influence on the climate such  
10 as minimizing conversion of all native ecosystems to human land uses.

11  
12 The technical challenges of REDD are the same as those that confront forestry-based  
13 activities in the CDM. These include the determination of baselines (meaning decisions on  
14 how to calculate business-as-usual emissions and the additionality of reductions), the  
15 question of permanence, leakage (transferral of emissions from a project site to other areas  
16 beyond the project boundary), and importantly, the challenges of monitoring and verification  
17 (through satellite observation or sampling approaches). Proposals to address these constraints  
18 tend to involve one of two approaches: national regulation or project-level management. The  
19 essential differences between these approaches are ease of implementation and flexibility.  
20 National approaches are attractive because they are much simpler to mandate and finance, yet  
21 the challenge remains that countries where REDD programs are most likely to be  
22 implemented are also often those with least ability to conduct such programs, and poor  
23 records of governance and administrative capacity. Sub-national or project-based approaches  
24 require considerable flexibility depending on project locations and social conditions [72] and  
25 will benefit from the lessons of earlier conservation and development projects [73]. Yet top-

1 down national policies have resulted in the disproportionate representation of some countries  
2 at the expense of others in the international market. A localised approach could result in  
3 better outcomes for a wider range of participants [74].

4  
5 There are further institutional challenges to the development of integrated climate policies.  
6 Many countries lack the institutional and technical capacity to manage the administrative and  
7 transactional requirements of REDD and other mechanisms [75]. Implementation of REDD  
8 policies is further complicated by the presence of illegal activities and trade networks, corrupt  
9 governance and entrenched systems of vested interest, and questions of land tenure and  
10 property rights [76, 77]. The policies necessary to respond to these institutional challenges  
11 include reducing agricultural rents in forests, increasing and securing forest-derived incomes,  
12 directly regulating land use, forest protection and decentralisation of management [78].  
13 Policy mechanisms should be structured to support communities and forest managers through  
14 direct delivery of extension programs and funding within the context of local cultural and  
15 governance systems, rather than operating only in collaboration with national governments  
16 and agencies. This approach is complex but more likely to achieve sustainable systems in the  
17 longer term.

## 18 19 **The Way Forward**

### 20 **Expand Climate Change Paradigm**

21 As the Earth's climate forms part of a complex adaptive system, the current global climate  
22 change agenda needs to recognise that tackling climate change is a complex issue with  
23 multiple drivers and feedbacks. However, except for their role as carbon sources and sinks,  
24 the international climate policy dimensions of the impacts of LUCC on the surface fluxes of  
25 water, heat and aerosols, and their resultant effects on weather, have received minimal

1 attention. The omission of such local and regional-scale land-atmosphere forcings and  
2 feedbacks in climate change policies represents a major impediment to our ability to avoid  
3 critical transitions in the climate system at larger scales [79, 80].

4  
5 The current premise is that reduction of industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will diminish other  
6 environmental sustainability problems. The reality, however, is different. Human pressures  
7 on climate and land use are increasing the risk of abrupt environmental change. While  
8 Rockström *et al.* [81] claim that, globally, the pressures from change in land and freshwater  
9 use are within the “proposed safe operating space”, in many regions the limits of sustainable  
10 land and water use have been reached [23, 82]. At a local and regional scale, unsustainable  
11 land use pressures are equally or even more important than larger scale climate change driven  
12 by CO<sub>2</sub>. Many of these pressures relate to growing demand for commodities by developed  
13 and new consumer societies [83]. A recent report by the United Nations Environment  
14 Program [84] highlighted the need to change patterns of production and consumption,  
15 particularly through changing diets, in order to lessen the environmental impacts of  
16 population growth, and understand the linkages between different pressures on resources and  
17 the environment. It is critical, therefore, we proactively address climate change and  
18 environmental sustainability problems concurrently by adopting a complementary and  
19 precautionary assessment of the vulnerability of critical natural resources rather than wait  
20 until the CO<sub>2</sub> problem has been resolved [\*\*5, 10, \*44].

21  
22 There are five broad areas for which vulnerability assessments are needed: water, food,  
23 energy, human health and ecosystem function. Each area has societally critical resources. The  
24 vulnerability concept requires the determination of the major threats to these resources from  
25 climate, but also from other social and environmental issues. After these threats are identified



1 for each resource, then the relative risk from natural- and human-caused climate change  
2 (estimated from the GCM projections, but also the historical, paleo-records and worst case  
3 sequences of events) can be compared with other risks in order to adopt the appropriate  
4 mitigation/adaptation strategy.

5  
6 Continuing degradation of the biosphere has adverse consequences for water resources, food  
7 security, energy, ecosystem health and human well-being [\*\*5]. In addition, the ability of the  
8 biosphere to store carbon may be decreasing because of biogeochemical limitations on the  
9 capacity of vegetation to sequester carbon and also the overutilization of natural resources.  
10 Global cooperation on this matter is as pressing as reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, otherwise  
11 degradation of many of the Earth's ecosystems will continue and this degradation will be  
12 further reinforced by its positive-feedback relationships with changes in temperature,  
13 precipitation and extreme weather events [1]. Confronting the detrimental effects of LUCC  
14 requires assessing and managing the inherent trade-offs between meeting immediate human  
15 needs and maintaining the capacity of ecosystems to provide goods and services in the long  
16 term [23].

## 18 **Key Actions**

19 We propose that a new policy paradigm is needed, in which land use, land use change,  
20 forestry, biodiversity and sustainable economic and social development are recognised as  
21 integral components of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies (Table 1). The  
22 problem is that existing policy mechanisms (and those that are still being developed, such as  
23 REDD-plus) largely ignore the role of land surface-atmosphere forcings and feedbacks in  
24 regulating climate. This is an important policy failure, as deforestation and land use pressures  
25 can result in reduced ecological resilience and diminish the regenerative capacity of

1 ecosystems. It is also important to consider as part of a vulnerability assessment: i) the  
2 sensitivity of environmentally and societally important water, food, energy, and human health  
3 issues to these climate variability and change on short (e.g. days); medium (e.g. seasons) and  
4 long (e.g. multi-decadal) time scales; and ii) what actions (adaptation/mitigation) can be  
5 undertaken in order to minimize or eliminate the negative consequences of these changes (or  
6 to optimize a positive response).

7  
8 [Insert Table 1 approx here]  
9

10 *Action 1: Stronger integration of inter-governmental policies and protocols*

11 At the global or intergovernmental level, we need to take an integrated approach in policy  
12 responses to more effectively address the challenges of climate change and environmental  
13 sustainability (Table 1). Current inter-governmental policies and protocols require a broader  
14 consideration of climate processes including the effects on land-atmosphere forcings and  
15 feedbacks at multiple scales. At present, inter-governmental policies and protocols for  
16 addressing global problems (e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone  
17 Layer, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the Millennium Development Goals) are  
18 not well integrated. The separation of Montreal and Kyoto protocols is a good example of  
19 where more integration is required as it has become apparent in recent years that  
20 replacements for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) resulted in a strong impact on the climate  
21 system via their role as greenhouse gases [85, 86]. The Millennium Development Goals aim  
22 to integrate the principles of sustainable development into national policies and programmes  
23 and reverse the loss of environmental resources and biodiversity, but have limited reference  
24 to climate change. Perhaps the best example of this lack of integration is provided by the  
25 Framework Convention on Climate Change (signed in 1992), the Convention on Biological

1 Diversity (1992) and the Convention on Desertification (1994): all three are targeted towards  
2 particular aspects of what is essentially a single complex problem. It is unclear whether any  
3 of these agreements will be successfully implemented resulting in tangible on-ground  
4 outcomes in reducing the vulnerability of terrestrial ecosystems resulting from land-use  
5 pressures and climate change.

6  
7 *Action 2: Strengthen carbon market mechanisms*

8 Existing regulated carbon market mechanisms such as the CDM need to be strengthened to  
9 facilitate the greater engagement of forest-based activities and direct investment toward  
10 LULUCF activities. Encouraging regional governance and local management within  
11 international frameworks offers the most flexibility and greatest likelihood of achieving  
12 comprehensive and effective outcomes [\*\*87]. Under the current system, national  
13 governments (through their Designated National Authority or DNA) approve CDM projects  
14 after these have been validated as meeting regulatory requirements by accredited independent  
15 entities. DNAs could operate as guides for project development and implementation,  
16 participating in existing networks of non-government organisations, the private sector, the  
17 research community, and people in many places. The CDM could evolve to become a vehicle  
18 to link both natural forests and planted forests with regulated carbon markets, but this would  
19 require a decentralisation of authority, with the CDM Executive Board acting as a facilitator  
20 rather than as an adjudicator, directly training DNAs in methodological applications [52].  
21 This would expand the role of DNAs and encourage more direct national involvement in  
22 project development.

23  
24 Policy makers and business in developed economies have the opportunity to benefit from  
25 similar adjustments in their own domestic carbon market regulations. Recognition of the

1 broader ecosystem and social benefits that can be gained from various types of forest-based  
2 and land use activities within their own countries affords the possibility of engaging primary  
3 resource industries, the agriculture sector and communities in proactive climate policies.

4 While the economics of carbon sequestration in vegetation and soils and the costs and  
5 benefits of environmental services remain challenging [88, 89], more comprehensive  
6 participation by land managers in integrated mitigation and adaptation schemes is likely to  
7 bring increased profitability and risk avoidance for producers and business while allowing  
8 policy reforms to reflect both broad consensus and precautionary scientific approaches [90,  
9 91]. Arguably, delay in adapting to carbon-constrained business implies future disadvantage  
10 in international mechanisms and markets [92, 93].

11  
12 Current national climate change mitigation policies should be revised to incorporate a new  
13 focus on LULUCF. This revision needs to occur in all countries, not just developing countries  
14 with tropical forests, as some developed countries (Australia, for instance) escape coverage  
15 by existing instruments such as the CDM and REDD. Greater inclusion of forest-based CDM  
16 offsets in the cap-and-trade schemes of developed economies could encourage forestry  
17 projects internationally and play a part in improving the popular understanding of offset  
18 mechanisms, especially through the use of preferential classification schemes [93, 94, 95]. It  
19 may be that direct action is more relevant in developing country contexts whereas regulated  
20 markets (emission trading schemes) are appropriate in industrialised nations. Direct action  
21 allows for capacity building and extension work in conjunction with technology and funding  
22 transfers. Market-based mechanisms offer the consumer populations of industrialised  
23 democratic societies the opportunity to participate in voluntary markets and preferentially  
24 drive offset supply.

25

1 This is an opportune moment for climate policy reform. Political circumstances in many  
2 advanced economies are in many ways more balanced than in previous decades. In Australia,  
3 for instance, the balance of power in the national parliament is held by rural independents and  
4 the pro-environment party for the time being. The interests of primary producers and  
5 conservationists in many ways coincide, and there appear to be synergies in the policy  
6 approaches of disparate stakeholders. It may be that because traditional opponents are being  
7 required to collaborate this will result in more comprehensive, inclusive and successful policy  
8 reforms. Recognising the importance of land-atmosphere interactions in climate systems  
9 mandates the involvement of the agriculture and forestry sectors in climate strategy. Despite  
10 the challenges inherent in the political economy of mitigation, adaptation and regional  
11 resource management strategies, it is imperative that the most capable countries and  
12 institutions endeavour to formulate effective, integrated approaches [\*53, 96, 97].

13  
14 *Action 3: Avoiding deforestation*

15 Political will and institutional reform are required at a national level to substantially reduce  
16 current global rates of deforestation. At present there is no policy recourse if regulated carbon  
17 market mechanisms do not meet expectations due to failure to reach a global agreement,  
18 insufficient finance or poor governance [77]. Such policy reforms are critical, and need to be  
19 informed by the existing LUCC science incorporating the available knowledge about the  
20 specific proximate causes and underlying drivers of deforestation and forest regeneration in  
21 each region [98, 99, 100]. Complementary to this, Lambin and Meyfroidt [\*101] argue that  
22 cost effective policy options should emphasise a slowing down of deforestation by  
23 accelerating land use transitions rather than halting deforestation. This would involve a set of  
24 interventions outside the forestry sector that have historically accounted for deforestation,  
25 such as diversifying income sources for local communities, institutional and technological

1 reform, and changing global consumption patterns. The authors believe that this would lead  
2 to more sustainable land use practices in the long-term.

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7 4 Protecting remaining intact native forests and woodlands (as well as other terrestrial  
8  
9  
10 5 ecosystems) within a regional land use planning framework is critical to maintaining their  
11  
12 6 favourable feedbacks on the local and regional climate. Management-based repair of land-  
13  
14 7 atmosphere feedbacks particularly needs to recognise the important function of forests and  
15  
16  
17 8 woodlands that are not carbon rich or are not a conservation priority. This requires  
18  
19 9 implementation of policies to maintain and restore healthy ecosystem functioning of *all*  
20  
21  
22 10 forests and woodlands across *all* land ownerships. These policies, implemented through  
23  
24 11 integrated landscape designs, can deliver multiple benefits for restoring hydrological  
25  
26  
27 12 functioning of ecosystems and increasing their resilience to the impacts of climate variability  
28  
29 13 and change [36].  
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34 15 *Action 4: Develop a coordinated global forest monitoring program*

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36 16 A critical aspect of halting global deforestation and forest degradation is a consistent multi-  
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39 17 national monitoring program that ensures the timely tracking and credible accounting of the  
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41 18 changes taking place. Currently, monitoring the terrestrial component of the biosphere and its  
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44 19 role in climate change lags behind that of the atmosphere and ocean [102, 103]. Several  
45  
46 20 issues related to the measurement of LUCC and greenhouse gas emissions were addressed in  
47  
48  
49 21 theory in the Good Practice Guide 2003 [104], but have not been implemented due to the lack  
50  
51 22 of data to feed the information process. A comprehensive monitoring program needs to define  
52  
53  
54 23 robust spatial and temporal sampling schemes that provide the necessary precision, and  
55  
56 24 ensure that data can be used for several ends, such as land cover, carbon stocks, biodiversity  
57  
58 25 and modelling of future patterns of change. A global land cover/land use monitoring protocol  
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1 is required to underpin the accounting of carbon, land–atmosphere interactions, hydrological  
2 flows and biodiversity. This should be capable of monitoring different degrees of forest loss,  
3 degradation and regrowth that can occur through time, underpinned by unifying definitions  
4 (e.g., of forests, “avoided deforestation”), land-cover classifications, input data and methods  
5 to adequately monitor such changes, including transparency and uncertainty assessments  
6 [105].

7  
8 The need for credibility and accountability is a crucial aspect in this process, yet flexibility is  
9 also necessary to achieve consensus and incorporate the disparate social, economic and  
10 biophysical conditions of different countries. At the international level, it would be possible  
11 to establish a single credible scientific body which produces consolidated and verified reports  
12 from each country or region of national carbon stocks and land use accounts similar to the  
13 national greenhouse gas inventories required under Kyoto. A consistent and accountable  
14 monitoring system for LUCC will need to be able to separate direct human-induced impacts  
15 (e.g. land management) from dieback/degradation due to climate variability and natural  
16 disturbances (e.g. fires, drought).

17  
18 Several remote-sensing resources are emerging as suitable for the global monitoring of  
19 LUCC. For example, a time-series of the Fraction of Absorbed Photosynthetically Active  
20 Radiation (FAPAR) is a suitable variable for monitoring and characterising the impacts of  
21 land use, climate variability and climate change on the biosphere [36]. FAPAR exhibits large-  
22 scale inter-annual variation and multi-year trends, with more than a decade of global  
23 observations already available. The LIDAR technology is another promising avenue for the  
24 needed 3D land cover mapping [106, 107]. The Global Forest Resources Assessment  
25 initiative (FRA2010) launched by FAO in October 2009

1 (<http://geonetwork4.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/fra.home>) also is an important and promising  
2 starting point in this direction. However, the methodological framework of the FRA2010 still  
3 shows various shortcomings according to the evaluation performed by Steininger et al. [108]  
4 who found that sampling errors could be in excess of 20%. Remote sensing is the undisputed  
5 basis for monitoring, but needs to be accompanied by field measurements. But, to ensure  
6 optimal and comparable results, improved transnational cooperation and training is required.  
7 Technically, approaches such as the one provided by Asner [109] may be ideal to help reach  
8 Tier II and III mapping levels, but will still take an unknown amount of time to be globally  
9 operational. Although the costs of satellite data are decreasing, the availability, image  
10 processing costs and temporal coverage are still an issue.

11  
12 To establish a monitoring system that can effectively address the above cited requirements  
13 several questions remain: When will the needed data become accessible and free? When will  
14 the data and services become interoperable? What are the most cost-effective spatial and  
15 temporal resolutions? How often should the monitoring system update the land cover maps?  
16 How should sub-national monitoring strata be defined to accommodate the high variability of  
17 land cover and socioeconomic processes?

## 18 19 **Conclusion**

20 The role of terrestrial ecosystems, especially tropical and sub-tropical forests and woodlands,  
21 in the climate debate has predominantly focused on their potential for carbon sequestration. It  
22 is critical to adopt a broader perspective on the role of forests and other ecosystems in the  
23 climate debate and in climate policy mechanisms. This requires global and regional climate  
24 approaches which recognise the climate regulation function that forests and woodlands play  
25 through moderating regional climate variability, resisting abrupt change to existing climate



1 regimes, as well as underpinning the hydrological cycle. This is especially important in the  
2 tropics and sub-tropics. Failure to acknowledge and adopt this broader perspective on dealing  
3 with the problem of climate change will result in sub-optimal solutions at the global scale and  
4 possible severe and irreversible damage at the regional scale.

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1 **Figure captions.**

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3 **Figure 1.** Schematic of the multiple forcings and feedbacks impacting on the climate system  
4 in tropical and sub-tropical regions. Changes in land surface-atmosphere feedbacks are  
5 depicted for intact native ecosystems (left side) on moisture recycling and agricultural land  
6 use resulting from the conversion of intact native ecosystems (right side). The conversion of  
7 native forests and woodland ecosystems to crops and livestock pastures results in: reduced  
8 moisture recycling, net primary production, and carbon storage and sequestration; and  
9 increase in the sensible heat flux. These changes cumulatively impact on climate responses,  
10 with decreased cloud cover and precipitation over the modified land surface. Note: The width  
11 of the yellow lines is relative and does not represent absolute values.

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**Figure 2.** Schematic showing the future of Earth's climate and ecosystems are strongly linked by land use and land cover change in addition to increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub>. Note: The widths of the green and yellow lines are proportional to percentage forest cover and greenhouse gases and do not represent absolute values.

6

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Figure 1




Figure 1.

Figure 2




Figure 2.

Table 1: Summary of key policy priorities and accompanying actions for broadening the perspective on dealing with the problem of climate change and variability.

Priorities	Purpose	Key Actions	Potential implementation	Actors	Scale
Integrate inter-governmental policies and protocols	More effectively address the challenges of climate variability and change and environmental sustainability	Assess existing policies and overlap. Develop stronger and more coordinated global agendas to reduce vulnerability of terrestrial ecosystems to land-use pressures and climate.	Need political will and cooperation to initiate and implement, but some precedents e.g. Montreal Protocol	National governments/global institutions	International, national
Strengthen carbon market mechanisms	Broaden the focus from controlling industrial CO <sub>2</sub> emissions to include LUCF	Strengthen CDM to link both native forests and planted forests with regulated carbon markets. Stronger focus of mitigation policies on LULUCF. Implement REDD+. Quantify the role of LUCF on changing surface fluxes of heat and water vapour and assess if this should be included as part of the market mechanisms.	Possible with appropriate funding and institutional support. Builds on existing mechanisms under COP process	National governments/global institutions. Non government organisations	International, national.
Avoid future deforestation	Ensure total forest cover increases with controlled deforestation and strategic reforestation	Address proximate and global drivers. Conduct vulnerability and risk assessments linked to climate models, and worst case historical and recent paleo-events. Develop regional land use and forest management plans. Strengthen institution capacity to ensure regulations are in place. Provide funding and policy guidance to developing countries. Societal and institutional change.	Difficult to enforce, but possibly with sufficient funding e.g. offsets and carbon markets Main problem lies in dealing with non-compliance or loss of forest through natural disturbances	National/local government, business, community	International, national, regional, local
Develop coordinated global forest monitoring program	Monitor forest loss and regeneration Policy effectiveness and compliance	Develop cost effective remote sensing methods. Establish land cover/land use baselines. Identify most effective spatial and temporal resolution.	Technically achievable.	Research institutes, national/local government, business	International, national, regional