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Brazil's COVID-19 epicenter in Manaus: How much of the population has already been exposed and are vulnerable to SARS-CoV-2?

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Abstract: Is Brazil's COVID-19 epicenter really approaching herd immunity? A recent study estimated that in October 2020 three-quarters of the population of Manaus (the capital of the largest state in the Brazilian Amazon) had had contact with SARS-CoV-2. We show that 46% of the Manaus population having had contact with SARS-CoV-2 at that time is a more plausible estimate, and that Amazonia is still far from herd immunity. The second wave of COVID-19 is now evident in Manaus. We predict that and the pandemic of COVID-19 will continue throughout 2021, given the duration of naturally acquired immunity of only 270 days and the slow pace of vaccination. Manaus has a large percentage of the population that is susceptible (35% to 45% as of May 17, 2021). Against this backdrop, measures to restrict urban mobility and social isolation are still necessary, such as the closure of schools and universities, since the resumption of these activities in 2020 due to the low attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 were the main trigger for the second wave in Manaus.

Keywords: Coronavirus, Amazon, Manaus, herd immunity, immunity loss, reinfection, SEIR, SEIRS

Introduction

Manaus, the capital of the largest state in Brazil's Amazon region, gained significant world attention when non-scientific media reported that the city could be the first place in the world to have achieved herd immunity [1]. In local media and political discourse this misinformation was reinforced based on a preprint by Buss and coworkers [2] (which was later published after significant modifications) in which the authors argued that three-quarters of the population had already been exposed to SARS-CoV-2 by October 2020 [3]. In August 2020 the possibility of a second wave of COVID-19 had been predicted to be the likely due to the negligence of decision-makers [4]. The situation in Manaus in January and February 2021 corroborates the occurrence

51 of a second wave with a surge of confirmed cases, hospitalizations, and deaths [5],
52 contradicting the hypothesis of herd immunity.

53 The same authors who had raised the hypothesis of herd immunity published a
54 second paper putting forward an alternative hypothesis, suggesting that their
55 calculations could have been mistaken and that the attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 in
56 Manaus may have been overestimated [6]. Here we test the hypothesis that the attack
57 rates of SARS-CoV-2 were overestimated, in addition to presenting a more plausible
58 model for the first and second waves in Manaus using the real attack rates of SARS-
59 CoV- 2 on the population. These data are particularly important for guiding decision
60 making on strategies to contain the pandemic in Manaus, in addition to their relevance
61 to the ongoing congressional investigation of the decisions that generated the second
62 COVID-19 wave in the region.

63

64 **Methods**

65

66 *The SEIR, SEIRS, and multi-strain models*

67

68 The SEIR (Susceptible – Exposed – Infected – Removed) model for simulating
69 the time evolution of epidemics is the primary tool for analyzing the epidemiological
70 curves of the COVID-19 pandemic [7-10]. Individuals susceptible to infection in a
71 population come into contact at random with the SARS-CoV-2 virus, becoming
72 exposed. After the incubation period, they become infected and can transmit the virus
73 randomly to other susceptible individuals. Infected individuals can be either
74 asymptomatic (have few or no symptoms) or symptomatic. Over time, infected
75 individuals are removed (they either recover or die and no longer can infect susceptible
76 individuals). The SEIRS (Susceptible – Exposed – Infected – Removed- Susceptible)
77 model [11, 12] is an extension of the SEIR model, allowing individuals who have been
78 removed and are still surviving to become susceptible again after a given average period
79 for loss of immunity. Adding individuals' capability to return to the infected pool
80 drastically changes the epidemiological regime, creating the possibility of recurring
81 waves of infection and a persistent, non-vanishing flux of COVID-19 hospitalizations
82 and deaths. The multi-strain [13, 14] SEIR model allows two or more strains of the
83 SARS-CoV-2 virus to co-exist, with different outbreak dates and transmission rates.

84 Our multi-strain SEIRS model combines the features of the SEIRS and multi-
85 strain SEIR models; this setup allows testing the hypotheses of the presence of a new
86 SARS-CoV-2 variant with a higher-than-usual transmission rate, along with a potential
87 loss of immunity. We studied a scenario under the multi-strain SEIRS model that was
88 based on a daily data series of social distancing in Manaus obtained from the COVID-
89 19 Community Mobility Reports [15], including public transportation usage from
90 February 15, 2020 to May 15, 2021, average immunity loss periods, new strain outbreak
91 dates, and transmission rates. Our model also assumes immunization of 15% of the
92 population by vaccine by May 15, 2021, this being the percentage of the population that
93 had received at least one dose of a vaccine by that date. Because we assume that all
94 persons with one dose of a vaccine are immunized, our model can be considered
95 conservative. We argue that the December 2020 surge of severe acute respiratory illness
96 (SARI) hospitalizations in Manaus cannot be fully explained by a multi-strain SEIR
97 model alone. However, it easily fits a multi-strain SEIRS model, assuming the
98 emergence of a new SARS-CoV-2 strain that is twice as contagious as the previous one
99 beginning on November 15, 2020 [16].

100

101 **Perspective**

102

103 Buss et al. reached their conclusion that three-quarters of the population had
104 been exposed based on blood-donor samples, a source with well-known selection bias
105 (as pointed out by the authors themselves) [3]. The study indicates a prevalence of
106 SARS-CoV-2 infection in the population as being between 4.1% and 5.5% [3] during
107 the period from April 6 to 17, 2020, immediately prior to the first collapse of the
108 hospital network and the explosive peak of deaths in epidemiological week 17 (April
109 19-25, 2020) [18]. Because the mortality indicator is a delayed sign of viral circulation,
110 the peak of community transmission occurred weeks earlier and not in early May, as
111 suggested by Buss et al. [3], contradicting Figure 7B of their Supplementary Material,
112 which shows that the peak of mortality (according to the occurrence date) was at the end
113 of April [3].

114 Buss et al. also estimated a high seroprevalence of 44.1 to 65.2% of the
115 population Manaus for the June 5-15, 2020 period [3]. This estimate differs radically
116 from data from another study that estimated seroprevalence at 14.6% in early June [19].
117 Buss et al. [3] attributed the discrepancy between these studies to sampling power, the
118 low sensitivity of rapid tests, and the decline in the humoral response. However,
119 although the study that estimated lower seroprevalence than the study by Buss et al. did
120 not make a correction for the decline of the humoral response, a correction for the
121 sensitivity of the rapid test was carried out, confirming the values in the study [19].
122 Thus, it does not seem plausible to attribute the difference in results to the factors
123 mentioned.

124 Buss et al. also suggested that the epidemic was ending in early August [3].
125 However, beginning in the second epidemiological week in August (epidemiological
126 week 33), severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) cases increased steadily, doubling in
127 the following months [20] and confirming a new acceleration of the epidemic in
128 Manaus [5], leading ICU occupancy in the public health system to grow from 36 beds
129 on August 19 [21] to 136 beds on December 20 [22]. Also, in the month between July
130 18 and August 17, 132 deaths due to COVID-19 were recorded, while in the month
131 between October 18 and November 17 there were 219 recorded deaths, an increase of
132 65.9% [23].

133 Epidemiological analyses show that the high (76%) infection prevalence
134 estimate of Buss et al. [3] is incompatible with their own assumed low value of 0.257%
135 for the infection fatality ratio (IFR), which would also imply an unrealistically high
136 efficiency of COVID-19 treatment per age group in Manaus's hospitals, as compared to
137 São Paulo's better-equipped hospitals (see Buss et al. [3], SM Figure 1). However,
138 hospitals in the Northern Region of Brazil, including the city of Manaus, had a mortality
139 rate of 50% for patients admitted for COVID-19, whereas in Brazil's Southeast Region,
140 where the city of São Paulo is located, there was only 34% mortality in patients
141 hospitalized for COVID-19 [24], which corroborates the incompatibility of the infection
142 prevalence estimated by Buss et al. with the IFR they estimated.

143

144 **Results and discussion**

145

146 Susceptible – Exposed – Infected – Removed (SEIR) and Susceptible – Exposed
147 – Infected – Removed – Susceptible (SEIRS) models are the primary tools for analyzing
148 the epidemiological curves of the COVID-19 pandemic [10]. Here we use a fully

149 stochastic, compartmental SEIR model to perform an analysis on data on reported
150 deaths and cases of SARI – the same data on which Buss et al. based their analyses.
151 Figure 1 depicts two no-intervention COVID-19 scenarios generated with the SEIR
152 model for observed (until October) and projected (November and December) numbers
153 of infected individuals and hospitalized patients in Manaus, assuming a (relatively high)
154 population-mixing value of 0.85 to fit the observed data.

155 The epidemiological curves are sensitive to the IFR value adopted. The first
156 scenario (Figure 1A) uses the 0.257% IFR value assumed by Buss et al. [3]. The second
157 scenario (Figure 1B) uses the more-realistic IFR value of 0.300%. The COVID-19
158 infection prevalence by October 15 predicted by the SEIR model is 54.7% for the first
159 scenario and 47.4% for the second scenario. The first scenario shows that Buss et al.'s
160 assumptions project a vanishing number of deaths from November onwards, which is
161 incompatible with the observed increasing trend in Manaus's hospitalizations in October
162 and November (Figure 1A). The second scenario matches the observed trend much
163 more closely (Figure 2B). We stress that these computed proportions of infected
164 individuals are, in both cases, upper limits, stretching the allowed population mixing
165 value significantly upwards to 85%. Another scenario with even more reasonable lower
166 population mixing and higher IFR values (e.g., 74% and 0.350%, respectively) produces
167 a smaller infection prevalence of 41.0%. In conclusion, the 76% infection prevalence of
168 COVID-19 as of October suggested by Buss et al. [3] is not supported by analyses using
169 SEIR compartment models. Moreover, given a significant reduction of mobility in
170 Manaus during the period from late March through May (Figure 2C), our models
171 adequately explain the reduction in transmission rates from June onwards (Figure 2B).
172 This is more plausible than the high infection rate defended by Buss et al. [3].

173 Based on the model that best fits the data from Manaus (Figure 2), it can be
174 concluded that the second wave of COVID-19 in Manaus was caused by the early
175 resumption of activities, with the main trigger being schools returning to face-to-face
176 classes when the proportion of susceptible people in Manaus was still high. The SEIRS
177 model suggests that there is a loss of immunity from natural contact with the virus in
178 around 270 days, which is corroborated by the literature [17]. The increase in cases,
179 hospitalizations and deaths due to relaxation of social distancing indicated by the SEIRS
180 model shows that this resulted from the return to face-to-face classes on September 24,
181 which swelled the volume of public transport in the following weeks when parents felt
182 safe to send their children to school. Schools were the main trigger initiating the second
183 wave. The return to face-to-face classes had a greater impact on the increase in cases
184 and hospitalizations than either the elections held on November 15 and 29 or the end-of-
185 year holidays. Our model also indicates that the second wave was already underway
186 before the emergence of the P.1 variant and that the variant originated only in the
187 middle of November when viral circulation increased due to the return to face-to-face
188 classes (Figure 2).

189 As a result, our updated multi-strain SEIRS model, shown in Figure 2, indicates
190 a substantial increase in COVID-19 hospitalizations by the second half of October,
191 followed by a sharp rise by the end of December 2020 (Figure 2B). As shown in Figure
192 2B, this second wave was not started by the new P.1 SARS-CoV-2 variant (blue line)
193 but rather by the older variant (green line). However, the P.1 variant boosted the second
194 wave, becoming prevalent by the end of 2020. The two variants combined produced a
195 second wave of hospitalizations and deaths even more significant than the first wave of
196 April-June 2020. Awareness of the sudden rise of hospitalizations in the last week of
197 December caused a substantial reduction in circulation (Figure 2C), which lasted
198 through January. Circulation increased again steadily from February until May 2021,

199 reaching levels above those at the beginning of the epidemic in March 2020. Assuming
200 no substantial acceleration of the vaccination program in Manaus, our model projects a
201 plateau of more than thirty COVID-19 daily hospitalizations and seven daily deaths in
202 this city.

203 Given the current levels of susceptible people in the population of Manaus (35%
204 until 45% of the entire population as of May 17, 2021), the increase in urban mobility
205 generated by the return of classroom or hybrid classes tends to lead to a third wave of
206 COVID-19 and to the emergence of new variants. Due to loss of the immunity acquired
207 from natural contact with SARS-CoV-2 and the low percentage of vaccination, it is
208 estimated through the SEIRS model that the safe resumption of either fully face-to-face
209 or hybrid classes in Manaus will only be possible when vaccination reaches at least 70%
210 of the city's population. A study published by FioCruz found that children are more
211 likely to be infected with SARS-CoV-2 than to be transmitting it, but the children in the
212 evaluated community remained in isolation and did not return to face-to-face classes
213 [25]. Children are known to have viral loads equivalent to those of adults, and they can
214 contaminate others even when they are themselves asymptomatic [26]. SARS-CoV-2
215 transmission occurs through the air, and cloth masks in Brazil only reduce transmission
216 by 15-70% [27], which casts doubt on the biosafety protocols used in Manaus and in
217 Brazil as a whole. The increase in viral circulation due to the return of face-to-face and
218 hybrid classes is associated with the increase in urban mobility caused by this return
219 (mainly in public transport), as was observed in October 2020.

220 The federal government's actions had the effect of disrupting state-level
221 responses, undermining emergency aid, delaying the purchase of vaccines and even
222 refusing to make drinking water available to affected Indigenous people [28]. Brazil's
223 Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) characterized this set of actions not as an unfortunate
224 sequence of mistakes and examples of bureaucratic incompetence, but rather as "a
225 political choice at the center of the presidential administration to prioritize protecting
226 the economy" [28]. A study of federal actions during the pandemic by the Center for
227 Research and Studies on Sanitary Law (CEPEDISA) of the Faculty of Public Health
228 (FSP) at the University of São Paulo (USP) concluded that: "By dismissing the thesis of
229 incompetence or neglect on the part of the federal government, this study reveals the
230 existence of an institutional strategy to spread of the virus, promoted by the federal
231 government under the leadership of the President" [28]. Supporters of President Jair
232 Bolsonaro defended the lifting of social isolation based on herd immunity [29], and
233 leading Bolsonaro supporters in the state of Amazonas engaged in anti-vaccination
234 lobbying [30]. Suggestions of stricter social isolation to contain the advance of the
235 pandemic and the possibility of a second wave were denied by representatives in the
236 Amazonas State legislature who support the president [31].

237 The governor of the state of Amazonas, Wilson Lima, refused to take measures to stop
238 the spread of the virus in Manaus as an "explicit strategy" to curry favor with President
239 Bolsonaro, according to vice-governor Carlos Almeida Filho, who broke with the
240 governor following the January 2021 Manaus oxygen crisis [32]. The vice-governor
241 stated in an interview that "the strategy was to show alignment [with Bolsonaro]. One
242 thing was clear, the policy was to claim that there was herd immunity" [32]. In Brazil's
243 National Congress a parliamentary commission of inquiry is investigating the actions of
244 the executive branch of government during the COVID-19 crisis (especially in Manaus)
245 [33]. On 25 May 2021 this commission heard the sworn testimony of Mayra Pinheiro
246 (executive secretary of the Ministry of Health) [33], where she defended an earlier
247 statement criticizing isolation measures that were taken for the whole population rather

248 than only for high-risk groups. She had stated “We hindered the natural evolution of the
249 disease in those people who would be asymptomatic, such as children, and we would
250 have had a herd immunity effect” [34]. The admission that the federal government
251 defended the return to face-to-face classes in order to stimulate SARS-CoV-2 viral
252 spread so that the population could reach herd immunity is significant (e.g. [35]), since
253 President Bolsonaro has official responsibility for the government’s having promoted
254 this strategy through the health ministry's "Brazil cannot stop" campaign [36]. This
255 means that, in order to achieve herd immunity, the President was taking responsibility
256 for a 1% mortality risk for the entire population of the country as a result of community
257 spread of SARS-CoV-2, which implies more than 1.4 million deaths [36]. The
258 testimony of Mayra Pinheiro shows that the Ministry of Health was engaged in
259 deliberate action by to stimulate COVID-19 infections, which culminated in the
260 emergence of the second wave and the appearance of the P1 variant.

261 The results of the present study confirm that Manaus never reached herd
262 immunity, and that herd immunity would be impossible to achieve solely by natural
263 contact with the virus. Our results also indicate that the second wave of COVID-19 in
264 Manaus started in October 2020, being triggered by the return to face-to-face classes on
265 September 24 and not by the P.1 variant, which appeared only in November according
266 to the SEIRS model. The proportions of infection by the P.1 variant in Manaus
267 estimated by the SEIRS model for the months of November, December and January
268 were corroborated by genomic data from Naveca and Costa, 2021 [16].

269 In addition, data on restrictive measures in 41 countries show that closing
270 schools and universities is one of the most effective the measures for curbing
271 community transmission of SARS-CoV-2, second only to restricting all encounters
272 between people to 10 persons or less [37]. Thus, the absence of social isolation and the
273 early resumption of activities based on the assumption that Manaus had reached herd
274 immunity caused the second wave of COVID-19 in the city of Manaus and the peak of
275 the wave was augmented by the P.1 variant.

276 It is vital to measure the true proportion of the population of Manaus that has
277 had contact with SARS-CoV-2 because results such as those of Buss et al. are being
278 used by politicians as an argument to justify the claim that the second wave of COVID-
279 19 in Manaus could not have been predicted. Instead, these politicians claim that the
280 second wave is entirely explained by the emergence of a new virus strain in the region
281 [38], and the surge of new cases has nothing to do with the lifting of social-distancing
282 measures by the health authorities and regional politicians, such as the return to face-to-
283 face classes. We had warned of the likely second wave of COVID-19 and collapse of
284 the health system in Manaus several months before these events took place, but
285 politicians neglected our warnings [4, 31]. The results here make it even more evident
286 that the second wave of COVID-19 in Manaus was due to negligence and not to the
287 emergence of a new virus strain in the region.

288 The Amazonas state government scheduled a new return to face-to-face classes
289 on 31 May 2021 [39]. This is of great concern given the population's low vaccination
290 rates and low immunity. Unfortunately, recent data show that the number of new cases
291 is already increasing [40-41], suggesting that the return of face-to-face classes will
292 trigger another crisis in the Manaus public health system.

293

294 **Conclusion**

295

296 Less than 50% of the city of Manaus had contact with SARS-CoV-2 by mid-
 297 October 2020. The herd immunity theory was used extensively by politicians to defend
 298 the lifting of social isolation, which significantly aggravated the current second wave in
 299 Manaus. Given that the loss of immunity due to natural contact with SARS-CoV-2 in
 300 Manaus is estimated at 270 days and that vaccination percentages are still very low, we
 301 estimate that at the beginning of May 2021 just over 55% of the population of Manaus
 302 had some immunity to SARS-CoV-2. This implies that the pandemic will continue
 303 during 2021 and puts Manaus at eminent risk of a third wave of COVID-19 in the face
 304 of new relaxations of restrictions, such as the return to face-to-face classes.

305

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311

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 314 analyses; LF, WAS, ACLA, JL, RCV, UT, PMF and LHD wrote the manuscript; LF,
 315 WAS, ACLA, JL, RCV, UT, PMF and LHD revised the manuscript.

316

317 **Compliance with Ethical Standards**

318 Conflict of Interest. The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

319

320 **References**

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
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
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480
 481 **Figure 1.** Simulation of COVID-19 in Manaus using (A) the infection fatality ratio
 482 (IFR) value from Buss et al. [3] and (B) a more-realistic IFR value. Infected individuals
 483 are shown by the black curve, while hospitalized patients are scaled to fit the black
 484 curve (daily counts in orange and moving window of averaged daily counts in red).
 485 Blue shading indicates 95% and 68% confidence intervals. The more-realistic scenario
 486 in (B) indicates substantial continued infections (and consequently deaths).
 487



535 **Figure 2.** Model with best fit and that best explains the first and second COVID-19
536 waves in Manaus. In **A**, violet (dark green) indicates the projected (observed) deaths. In
537 **B**, orange indicates daily observed hospitalizations; the projected hospitalizations due to

538 the two SARS-CoV-2 variants are indicated in green (original), blue (P.1) and black
539 (total). **C** shows the community use of public transport (busses), compared to the
540 February 2020 baseline.