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23

Copyright © 2008 by the author(s). Published here
under license by The Resilience Alliance.
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The following is the established format for
referencing this article:
Fearnside, P. M. 2008. The roles and
movements of actors in the deforestation of Brazilian Amazonia. Ecology
and Society 13(1): 23. [online] URL:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art23/

Insight, part of Special Feature on The influence of human demography and agriculture on natural
systems in the Neotropics

The Roles and Movements of Actors in the
Deforestation of Brazilian Amazonia

Philip
M. Fearnside 1

1National Institute for Research
in the Amazon-INPA

Abstract

Introduction

Landless
migrants (“sem terras”)

Colonists/small
farmers

Drug
traffickers/money launderers

Goldminers
(“garimpeiros”)

Laborers/debt
slaves

Capitalized
farmers

Landgrabbers
(“grileiros”)

Sawmill
operators/loggers

Actors
and Their Impacts

Future
Movements of Actors

Transformations
of Land and Actors

Policy
Implications

Remove
motives for deforestation

Stop
regularizing land claims

Cut
subsidies

Establish
the rule of law

Complete
a cadaster of land titles

Reinforce
command and control

Discourage
movement to frontier

Exercise
restraint in approving infrastructure

Create
and protect conservation units

Create
economic alternative

Create
employment in source areas and alternative destinations

Support
sustainable uses

Support
alternative supply of domestic markets

Reward
environmental services

Conclusions

Responses
to this Article

Acknowledgments

Literature
Cited

ABSTRACT

Containing the advance of deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia
requires understanding the roles and movements of the actors involved. The
importance of different actors varies widely among locations within the
region, and also evolves at any particular site over the course of
frontier establishment and consolidation. Landless migrants have
significant roles in clearing the land they occupy and in motivating
landholders to clear as a defense against invasion or expropriation.
Colonists in official settlements and other small farmers also are
responsible for substantial amounts of clearing, but ranchers constitute
the largest component of the region’s clearing. This group is most
responsive to macroeconomic changes affecting such factors as commodity
prices, and also receives substantial subsidies. Ulterior motives, such as
land speculation and money laundering, also affect this group. Drug
trafficking and money laundering represent strong forces in some areas and
help spread deforestation where it would be unprofitable based only on the
legitimate economy. Goldminers increase the population in distant areas
and subsequently enter the ranks of other groups. Work as laborers or debt
slaves provides an important entry to the region for poor migrants from
northeast Brazil, providing cheap labor to large ranches and a large
source of entrants to other groups, such as landless farmers and
colonists. Capitalized farmers, including agribusiness for soy production,
have tremendous impact in certain areas, such as Mato Grosso. This group
responds to commodity markets and provides justification for major
infrastructure projects. Landgrabbers, or grileiros, are important in
entering public land and beginning the process of deforestation and
transfer of land to subsequent groups of actors. These include sawmill
owners and loggers, who play an important role in generating funds for
clearing by other groups, ranging from landless migrants to large
ranchers. They also build endogenous roads, facilitating the entry of
other actors. Future movements of actors will be influenced by major
infrastructure plans, such as those for hydroelectric
dams.

Policies for reducing deforestation must include removing
motives for deforestation by stopping the practice of regularizing land
claims and by cutting subsidies. The rule of law must be established
throughout the region by completing the cadaster, or register, of land
titles and by reinforcing command and control. Movement to the frontier
needs to be discouraged by exercising restraint in approving
infrastructure such as highways, and by creating and protecting
conservation units. Economic alternatives to deforestation should be
fostered by generating employment in source areas and in alternative
migration destinations, by supporting sustainable uses of forest, by
supporting alternative supply of domestic markets for products such as
timber, and by rewarding the environmental services of standing forest.

Key words: deforestation; migration;
population; rainforest; ranching

INTRODUCTION
Amazonian deforestation
is one of the most serious environmental problems on Earth, with impacts
ranging from emission of greenhouse gases to disruption of the regional
water cycle and loss of biodiversity. Understanding the forces driving
deforestation is a top priority because any changes in policies designed
to contain deforestation are likely to fail if they are not based on
realistic scenarios of how the social processes involved operate today and
how they may change in the future. Migration is an important part of these
processes. The effect of population is very flexible because cattle
ranching (the main use of deforested land in Brazilian Amazonia) is an
activity through which a tiny population of humans can have a tremendous
impact on deforestation.

Deforestation is often modeled as a
process whereby clearing either spreads out from highways at a fixed rate
(e.g., Kirby et al. 2006, Laurance et al. 2001, 2002) or spreads at rates
determined in a “demand-driven” fashion as a regional total that is then
allocated to different locations based on “weights of evidence,” or
probabilities reflecting the attractiveness of each site based on such
characteristics as distance to roads and soil quality (Soares-Filho et al.
2004, 2006). Although these approaches have been important in providing
spatial representations of the probable future course of deforestation, a
more detailed actor-based approach will be needed if the social processes
underlying deforestation are to be understood and eventually modified to
contain clearing.

Migration has much more impact on deforestation
than does the vegetative growth (increase through reproduction) of any
segment of the population. Migration involves not only the movement of
people, but also the movement of investment. The type of actor that is
moving into an area of forest is of primary importance in determining the
rate of spread of deforestation. Types of actors cover a full range in
terms of wealth, legality, and the intensive or extensive nature of their
activities (Table 1). The present paper examines what we know about nine
key groups of actors and their movements in Brazilian Amazonia: landless
migrants (“sem terras”), colonists/small farmers, ranchers, drug
traffickers/money launderers, goldminers (garimpeiros),
laborers/debt slaves, capitalized farmers, landgrabbers
(grileiros), and sawmill operators/loggers.

ACTORS AND
THEIR IMPACTS

Landless Migrants (“Sem Terras”)

Poor
landless migrants arrive in the region from source areas such as the state
of Maranhão; one component of this migration is seeking free land, and
usually arrives as whole families (e.g., Trairão on the BR-163 Highway;
Fig. 1). Another component arrives as unaccompanied men who often work as
laborers rather than claiming land. In recent years, many of the migrants
seeking land have become “sem terras,” or members of organized groups such
as the Movement of Landless Rural Workers
(MST).

Migration from Maranhão has completely
transformed the central portion of the state of Pará, centered on Marabá.
This entire area is now degraded, including virtually every fragment of
forest left in the deforested landscape (personal observation; see also
Rede GEOMA 2003). The Carajás Railway, completed in 1985, has one
passenger train per week (with heavily subsidized ticket prices) as a
public-relations investment on the part of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
(CVRD), the formerly government-run company that operates both the Carajás
iron mine and the 890-km railway built to carry the ore to a port near São
Luis, Maranhão (Fearnside 1986a). The steady arrival of up to 100 families
a week in Marabá has supplied a virtually inexhaustible source of settlers
and landless migrants to central Pará (Fearnside 2001a). Violent land
conflicts have long been frequent (e.g., Schmink and Wood 1992, Simmons
2005). This violence gained public visibility with the El Dourado dos
Carajás massacre in April 1996, when landless migrants were gunned down by
military police. Of the 19 migrants killed, 13 were from
Maranhão.

Colonists/Small Farmers

Movements of small
farmers in the past have included migration to the Transamazon Highway
from other regions, such as the semi-arid Northeast, in the early 1970s
(Fearnside 1986b, Moran 1981, Smith 1982) and movement from Paraná to
Rondônia facilitated by the BR-364 Highway in the early 1980s (Fearnside
1989a, Mesquita and Egler 1979). Many of these people were “colonists”
(“colonos”), or settlers who are placed on lots in official settlement
areas of various types. Others were spontaneous squatters (“posseiros”)
who staked out claims on their own; these individual squatters have since
been largely supplanted by organized landless migrants (“sem terras”).
Particularly in the case of Rondônia, the result of migration in the 1970s
and early 1980s was a great explosion of deforestation. Subsequent
population movements to the settlement areas of both Rondônia and the
Transamazon Highway were of wealthier farmers who bought one or several of
the small farmers’ lots in order to establish ranches (Fearnside 1984).
Although large properties devote a greater proportion of their land to
cattle, pasture is also the dominant land use in small properties (Walker
et al. 2000).

Movements within the region now overshadow
inter-regional movements as sources of deforestation (Perz 2002). Such
movements are now opening frontiers, with a large role being played by the
children of such settlers, such as the migrants from Rondônia who are
opening areas in Maputi in southern Amazonas. Within each settlement area,
a succession of events takes place in which land use in the area changes
(usually to pasture) because of both changes in the land-use behavior of
the resident population and replacement of the population by other actors.
Individual settlers shift from planting annual crops such as rice to
establishing cattle pasture and increasing their herds. At the same time,
settlers frequently sell their lots to wealthier newcomers who often
consolidate several lots into a small ranch. During the first 5 years of
settlement on the Transamazon Highway, the half life of a family in the
original colonist population was only 11 years, that is, the attrition
rate corresponded to half of the original population departing over this
period of time (Fearnside 1986b, page 117).

The small-farmer
settlements themselves can be a source of large operators, including
“grileiros.” In Apuí, in southern Amazonas, the Juma colonization project
was established by the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian
Reform (INCRA) in the early 1980s with settlers primarily coming from the
southern Brazilian states of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná. Today most of
the largest landholders in the Apuí area are people who originally arrived
as Juma-project colonists (Razera 2005).

Displaced small farmers
within the region have become a factor in some locations, such as the
large area of deforestation around Novo Repartimento, Pará that was
initiated by population moving from the area near the Tucuruí reservoir
(Fearnside 1999b). The initial movement into the area in 1992 was to flee
from a plague of Mansonia mosquitoes in a settlement area to which
they had been assigned on the western shore of the Tucuruí reservoir. The
group camped for 2 years at the entry gate to the electrical authority’s
compound in a vain attempt to get an alternative settlement area. They
then followed logging roads that had been built from Tucumã to the
Transamazon Highway. By 2003, this area had become one of the fastest
growing deforestation hotspots in Amazonia (Fig.
2).

Ranchers

Ranchers are key actors in Amazonian
deforestation and are responsible for most of the clearing. The
predominant role of ranchers explains why poverty is not correlated with
deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, unlike many other parts of the
tropics (Chomitz 2007, pages 93–98). The profit made by a rancher is the
total of the income derived from all sources applicable to a given ranch,
not only what comes from the sale of beef cattle. Other sources of income
can include sale of timber or logging rights (and, in some locations,
charcoal), speculative gains from land sales, government subsidies and the
use of the operations in laundering money from crime, corruption, and tax
evasion. The relative importance of these “ulterior” income sources,
compared with beef sales, varies among locations, among ranchers, and over
time. In areas where the initial frontier phase has passed, the
“traditional” beef economy is predominant, with land-use decisions being
made based on beef production rather than land speculation and other
ulterior motives (e.g., Faminow 1998, Margulis 2003, Mattos and Uhl 1994,
Mertens et al. 2002). In limited areas where milk production and
processing have become established, particularly in Ouro Preto do Oeste,
Rondônia, the profit from this activity is a key driver (Caviglia-Harris
2004, Faminow 1998). The role of beef sales has increased over time with
such factors as continual expansion and improvement of the road network,
proliferation of slaughterhouses, the opening of export markets (with
progress in eliminating foot-and-mouth disease), and in older frontiers,
exhaustion of timber and of uncleared land. Ranching for beef or milk
production and capitalized farming for soybeans are activities that are
especially sensitive to the effect of site quality on expected yield.
Expected yield also affects land prices and other drivers. Excessive
rainfall in western Amazonas reduces expected yields there, contributing
to the persistence of forest (Chomitz and Thomas
2003).

Historically, the importance of ulterior motives for
ranching has undergone wide swings. Major booms have passed, such as the
incentives from the Superintendency for Development of the Amazon (SUDAM)
in the 1970s and early 1980s (Binswanger 1991, Mahar 1979) and generalized
land speculation during the hyperinflation before the 1994 Real Plan
(e.g., Hecht 1985, Hecht et al. 1988). However, both government subsidies
and land speculation continue to play roles in Amazonian
ranching.

The importance of beef sales is consistent with the
recent history of deforestation rates in Brazilian Amazonia. The price of
beef in Brazil in real terms declined steadily from 2001 through early
2006, after which it rose through the end of 2007 (e.g., Kianek 2008). The
deforestation rate increased over the 2001–2004 period and then decreased
through July 2007, after which it increased again. Beef prices show a
strong correlation with the deforestation rate in the following year over
the 1995–2007 period (Institute for Man and Environment in the Amazon
(IMAZON) unpublished; see Pichonelli and Magalhães 2008). This includes
the deforestation peak in 1995 and subsequent decline through 1997,
although this fluctuation also derived from the effect of the 1994 Real
Plan in releasing investment capital and in stopping inflation and
associated land speculation (Fearnside 2005).

The cattle herd in Brazilian Amazonia increased by 173% between 1990
and 2004 (IMAZON unpublished; see Pichonelli and Magalhães 2008). Brazil’s
herd as a whole has gone through a major oscillation since 1999,
increasing by approximately 20 million head to a peak in 2004 and then
declining by an equal amount through 2007, including liquidation of many
females. This drawdown, combined with the rising beef prices starting in
2007, is projected to drive a substantial increase in beef prices through
2009 (Kianek 2008). Beef is a “pernicious” commodity, in contrast to most
crops such as soybeans, in that the cattle represent both the product and
the means of production. The result is that when prices rise, ranchers
hold their stocks (especially females) for reproduction and growth, rather
than selling them off (Mascolo 1979). This produces more exaggerated price
swings—and a greater stimulus for deforestation. The price of beef can,
therefore, be expected to be a powerful driver of Amazonian deforestation
by ranchers in the coming years.

Drug Traffickers/Money Launderers

Significant
areas of deforestation can result from use of money from illegal
activities elsewhere, for example in areas held by drug traffickers and
money launderers in the Terra do Meio between the Xingu River and the
BR-163 Highway in Pará (Escada et al. 2005, Geffray 2002, Machado 2002,
Pontes Júnior et al. 2004, Schönenberg 2002). The Terra do Meio (Fig. 1)
is an area the size of Switzerland that is largely outside of the control
of the Brazilian government. Staff from government agencies such as the
Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(IBAMA) only enters the area on brief forays; a plan to establish a base
in the area announced in 2003 has still not been carried out. The power of
the underground economy to affect deforestation in the Terra do Meio was
demonstrated most clearly in 2003 when a 6200-ha clearing appeared in the
area in only 3 weeks’ time (e.g., Venturieri et al. 2004). The site, known
as “the revolver” because of the shape of the clearing, is far from any
roads and is in an area that, because of its remoteness, has been
calculated to have the lowest farm-gate values of beef cattle in Amazonia
(Arima et al. 2005, page 50). The legitimate economy, therefore, cannot
explain clearings of this kind.

Goldminers (“Garimpeiros”)

Mining gold does
not directly result in large areas of deforestation, although other
environmental and social impacts are severe, including destruction of
aquatic habitats, mercury pollution, and negative impact on the health and
culture of indigenous peoples. Indirectly, however, gold mining has
contributed to deforestation processes. During the 1980s, when the price
of gold was at a high point, the prospect of wealth from gold induced
thousands of freelance prospectors (“garimpeiros”) to come to the Amazon
from other parts of Brazil, especially Maranhão. Most of these people
remained in the region, usually in some other role such as landless
migrants or small farmers. In some cases, money from gold contributed to
expanding the agricultural and ranching activities in settlement areas,
settlers temporarily leaving their lots to work in the mining areas
(MacMillan 1995). In 2008, the crash in financial markets, especially in
the United States, suddenly drove gold prices to record levels, raising
the prospect of renewed pressure on Amazonia from goldminers.

Laborers/Debt
Slaves

One component of migrants to the region is composed
of single men or men who arrive without their families. Many of these
people seek employment as laborers, and many find themselves working as
slave labor in deforestation crews that are assembled by “gatos”
(literally “cats,” referring to intermediaries who supply labor to
ranchers who contract clearing for an agreed amount per hectare). The
laborers buy their food and other supplies on credit from the “gato” at
grossly inflated prices and soon accumulate debts that grow faster than
any credit can possibly be earned through labor. The result is that the
laborer is then trapped as a “slave” who would be shot if he attempted to
leave (Rocha 2005). The same applies to the notorious charcoal-making
industry (e.g., Fearnside 1999a, Sutton 1994). Particularly in the case of
charcoal making, entire families are held, including children. Both
“degrading conditions analogous to slavery” (International Labor
Organization 2002) and child labor violate Brazilian labor legislation.
Ranchers and intermediaries can “buy” slaves by paying off their debt to
another operator (e.g., Agência Carta Maior 2007). Although over the years
a minimal enforcement effort has meant that these practices are tolerated
in practice on Amazonian deforestation frontiers, there has also been an
increased enforcement effort in recent years. In 2002, Brazil had an
estimated 15 000 such “slaves” (Anonymous 2002), a number that has
undoubtedly grown substantially since despite the efforts of a Ministry of
Labor “mobile team” to locate and free them. A 2006 estimate placed the
number at 25 000 just in Pará (Campbell 2006). The presence of slaves
contributes to deforestation by providing cheap labor to ranchers and
“grileiros.” Those laborers who avoid slavery or who are released often
become landless migrants, thereby playing other roles in the deforestation
process. Between 1995 and 2006, 20 000 slaves were freed in Brazil as
a result of government raids, according to the agency responsible (Diário
do Pará 2006).

Capitalized Farmers

More capitalized small
farmers come to Amazonia from other regions seeking land purchase,
especially those who have sold small farms in southern Brazil and are
using the funds to invest in larger parcels in Amazonia. Private
settlement projects in Tucumã, Pará and in Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso in
the late 1970s and early 1980s facilitated this kind of movement for small
landowners from southern Brazil (Browder and Godfrey 1997, pages 226–230).
Now this pattern is being followed by soy farmers moving from Mato Grosso
to the Santarém area on the BR-163 Highway, and to a lesser degree in the
state of Amazonas on the BR-319 Highway. Investment has been increasing in
raising beef for export (Arima et al. 2005, Smeraldi and May 2008) and in
soybeans (Brown et al. 2005, Fearnside 2001b, Hecht 2005). Soybean
plantations are installed both on land converted from pasture and on land
converted directly from tropical forest. Land converted from tropical
forest is sometimes first planted to another annual crop to “prepare” the
soil for soy. In Mato Grosso, deforestation for annual crops is highly
correlated to soybean prices in the same year (Morton et al. 2006).
Deforestation for both pasture and soybeans increased over the 1997–2004
period, followed by a decline over the 2005–2007 period, coincident with
falling international prices for these commodities and a worsening
exchange rate of the Brazilian real against the U.S. dollar from the
point-of-view of Brazilian exporters (Table 2). The price of soybeans,
expressed in reais, declined by half between 2005 and 2007, whereas the
deforestation rate fell by a similar percentage between 2004 and 2007
(Arini 2008).

A recovery of soy prices in 2007 has
spurred a surge of deforestation activity in the state of Mato Grosso.
Internationally, the price of soybeans rose throughout 2007, entering into
the territory of all-time record prices on the Chicago Commodity Exchange
beginning in December 2007 (Globo Video 2008). Between August and November
2007, approximately 7000 km2 were deforested according to an
estimate based on MODIS satellite data released by the Instituto Nacional
de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE) (Brazil, INPE 2008). The Minister of
Agriculture (Reinhold Stephanes) and the governor of Mato Grosso (soybean
magnate Blairo Maggi) vigorously denied any connection between soybeans
and the deforestation surge (Sant’Anna 2008). However, although many of
the 36 municipalities identified as deforestation hotspots are located in
areas dominated by ranching, several are right in the middle of the soy
belt in Mato Grosso, such as Nova Ubiratã, Ulianópolis, and Querência
(Zanini and Cabral 2008).

The current rush to biofuels represents
an additional future attraction for movement of capital and capitalized
farmers to Amazonia (Kileen 2007). In 2007, the Brazilian government began
an intensive campaign to attract international interest in importing
biofuels from Brazil, particularly alcohol from sugarcane. The Ministry of
External Relations repeatedly claimed that there is “no limit” to how much
biofuel Brazil can export—whatever the world wants to buy, Brazil can
expand its production to supply it. Unfortunately, Brazil, like every
other country, does have limits. In this case, severe limits are implied
by the environmental impact of greatly expanding areas of crops for
feedstocks. Energy crops destroy natural ecosystems both by replacing them
directly and by displacing other land uses, especially cattle pasture, to
forest areas in Amazonia. Cattle have been displaced to Amazonia from
former ranching areas in other parts of Brazil by the advance of soybeans
and, more recently, sugarcane for alcohol (Smeraldi and May 2008). Recent
analyses have shown that the net result of converting tropical forest to
energy crops is highly negative for many decades (Fargione et al. 2008,
Searchinger et al. 2008a). In fact, the impact of current trends is even
more negative because these analyses do not include the additional impact
of deforestation for cattle ranching that is displaced into Amazonia by
expansion of energy crops in other parts of Brazil (Searchinger et al.
2008b, page 11).

Landgrabbers (“Grileiros”)

A form of movement
with significant consequences is represented by groups of large illegal
landgrabbers (“grileiros”). “Grilo” means “cricket” in Portuguese, and the
term “grileiro” is supposedly a reference to a practice (whether it be
fact or lore) of forged titles being made to look old by placing them for
a few days in a box filled with crickets. “Grileiros” obtain large blocks
of land through forgery, bribery, and/or violence. These practices are
made easier by the confused and overlapping land claims in Amazonia and by
the decentralized nature of “cartorios” (document repositories) scattered
across the region in municipal seats. “Grileiros” can make money by
exploiting timber and other resources whether or not they are ultimately
successful in obtaining title. They make large profits by subdividing and
selling their claim to others, who may or may not be aware of the illegal
status of the land claim. Holding claims requires the services of
gunslingers (“pistoleiros”) and others on the ground in the areas
involved. Movement of “grileiros” from the BR-163 Highway in Pará to the
Apuí area in Amazonas is a type of event that can result in large areas of
deforestation even though the number of people is small (Fearnside
2007).

Sawmill
Operators/Loggers

Sawmill owners represent another migratory
group with great impact on the forest. A substantial number came to
Amazonia after destroying the Atlantic forest in either Espirito Santo or
Paraná. These groups first came to areas in northern Mato Grosso such as
Sinop, but with exhaustion of the forest have moved on to Rondônia or to
areas on the BR-163 Highway such as Moraes de Almeida and Novo Progresso
(e.g., Schneider et al. 2000, Alencar et al. 2004, Lentini et al.
2005).

Each year, logging affects an area approximately as large as
the areas being deforested. Asner et al. (2005) used LANDSAT imagery to
estimate an average of 15 383 km2/year over the 2000–2002
period, excluding the state of Amazonas. Brazil’s National Communication
to the climate convention reports a rate an order of magnitude lower
(Brazil, Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) 2004, page 150), but
this estimate appears to have detected only the logging decks (small
clearings where logs are piled before transport) rather than the forest
from which logs have been removed. The impact of logging is greatly
magnified because of the increased probability of forest fires entering
the logged areas, thereby setting in motion a positive feedback process
that degrades the forest by successively more severe fires (Cochrane 2003,
Cochrane et al. 1999).

FUTURE
MOVEMENTS OF ACTORS
In the future, major movements
are expected as a result of two planned dams on the Madeira River,
scheduled for completion in 2012. The dams will employ 20 000
construction workers and this contingent of unemployed men will be dumped
almost simultaneously on Porto Velho at the end of the construction phase.
The planned reconstruction of the BR-319 Highway from Porto Velho to
Manaus makes it likely that a significant movement will occur to central
Amazonia and to Roraima, opening new frontiers to deforestation (Fearnside
and Graça 2006).

The plans for hydroelectric dam construction have
tremendous potential to stimulate migration. The only time the full extent
of dam-building plans has been released was the 2010 Plan in December 1987
(Brazil, Eletrobrás 1987; see Fearnside 1995). The plan listed 79 dams in
Brazil’s 5 million km2 Legal Amazon region, flooding
100 000 km2 or 2% of the region. Many of these dams would
displace significant resident populations, and all would stimulate
migration through the temporary employment offered during the construction
phase and by the roads built to each dam site (e.g., Fearnside 2001c,
2006).

TRANSFORMATIONS OF LAND AND
ACTORS
The nine categories of actors discussed
above, and the locations they occupy, can undergo a series of
transformations over time. The land in a particular place may start as
public land and be invaded either by large “grileiros,” by individual
squatters, or by “sem terras” (Fig. 3). Ranchers may purchase large blocks
of land from “grileiros” or may buy a number of small colonist lots. The
ranches can be invaded by squatters or “sem terras,” or, if the land is
economically attractive for soybeans, the properties can be sold to
capitalized farmers.

Money flows from external
sources to specific groups of actors and speeds their clearing (Fig. 4).
Money from illegal sources can be laundered through investments by
“grileiros” and speculators, ranchers, and loggers. Government subsidies
make important contributions to ranchers, colonists, capitalized farmers
and, strange as it may seem, to “sem terras” (see Fearnside 2001a).
External legal sources flow mainly to ranchers and capitalized farmers.
Loggers play an important role by providing a source of funds through
timber sales by other actors, such as “grileiros,” ranchers, colonists,
and “sem terras.”

The actors themselves can pass
from one category to another with time, whether they remain in the same
location or not (Fig. 5). Those who come to Amazonia from other regions
can be grouped into “poor” and “non-poor” categories. Poor migrants have
options as laborers (often as “slaves”), as goldminers, as squatters, and
as “sem terras,” or as urban residents. Those who become goldminers or
slaves may later enter the ranks of squatters and “sem terras.” “Sem
terras” may be offered legal lots as colonists or may migrate to “favelas”
(shanty towns) in urban areas. Colonists may leave for urban areas or may
expand their holdings to become middle-sized ranchers, and some of these
will expand to become large ranchers. Urban centers drain some of the
population from groups such as “sem terras,” colonists, and middle-sized
ranchers.

POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Given the actors and processes
discussed above, measures that need to be taken to reduce deforestation
can be grouped into the following categories:

Remove Motives for
Deforestation

Stop
regularizing land claims

The violence and lawlessness of the
Amazon frontier is often compared with that of the “wild west” of
19th-century North America. The parallel with changes that took
place in North America is relevant, although greater expectation of
government support for smallholders in Brazil led to significantly more
violent conflict (Alston et al. 1998). The “closing of the frontier” in
the United States in 1890 (Turner 1893) marked a turning point after which
land for the taking was no longer available. Since that time, it has been
the general assumption that anyone who is poor or unemployed must search
for some sort of employment, either in the urban or rural setting. The
possibility of simply entering an area of forest and clearing a homestead
never even crosses people’s minds, and were such a thing to happen, the
squatter would be removed by police.

The movement of population and
investment in Amazonia (and its associated deforestation) are, in large
part, based on the expectation that invading and claiming public land will
eventually be rewarded by a permanent land title. This has been the
pattern in Brazil for over 400 years and is only likely to change by
either reaching the end of the available land or by an alteration of
national policy that is sufficiently visible and consistently enforced to
be accepted by the population (Fearnside 1979). Estimates of the number of
landless families in Brazil range from 5 to 10 million, which means that
even if the entire Amazon region were distributed as 50-ha lots, it would
be insufficient to solve the landlessness problem (e.g., Fearnside 1985).
Taking concrete steps to bring about the transition to end
“regularization” of land claims in Brazil is the most basic priority if
the damage from movement of population and investment is to be contained.
Of course, this transition cannot take place in isolation from programs to
offer alternative livelihoods to the population. Nonetheless, the bottom
line is that the frontier must be unambiguously closed.

Cut subsidies

A variety of
subsidies encourage loggers, ranchers, and others. The effect of subsidies
has evolved over time, but, contrary to popular perception, they are
important drivers of deforestation to this day. In the 1970s and early
1980s, subsidies through the Superintendency for the Development of
Amazonia (SUDAM) provided vast sums to large cattle ranches, both through
generous financing at interest rates below the prevailing rate of
inflation and through credit against taxes owed on unrelated operations
elsewhere in the country, in addition to tax exemptions on the ranching
operations themselves (e.g., Fearnside 1987, Mahar 1979). These programs
dwindled in the mid 1980s, but did not actually end until the mid 1990s,
years after official pronouncements had repeatedly claimed they no longer
existed. In fact, the tax exemptions on the original SUDAM-approved
ranches persist to this day (Brazil, Receita Federal 2007).

Other
subsidy programs have been added since the heyday of the SUDAM ranches.
The Constitutional Fund of the North (FNO) distributes funds from the
Banco da Amazônia (BASA). Under this is the National Program for
Strengthening Family Agriculture (Pronaf), which was created in 1995 and
expanded under the current presidential administration beginning in 2003.
A study by IMAZON has shown that Pronaf financing for small farmers in
official settlement areas results in much higher deforestation rates than
for comparable farmers in areas outside of the official settlements,
because farms outside the settlements lack access to the subsidized credit
program (Domingos 2008). Interest rates for small farmers are far lower
than those for any other enterprise at 1%–4% annually, compared with the
standard rate from Brazil’s Central Bank of 11.25%. In addition, small
farmers get a discount of 25% if they repay the loan on time, plus a
further “bonus” discount of 40% for loans under R$12 000
(approximately US$6700) (Domingos 2008). BASA also lends FNO funds to
medium and large property owners at subsidized rates: 5%–9% annual
interest depending on the size of the property, plus a 15% discount for
payments made on time (Domingos 2008). Aside from the subsidized interest
and the effects of discounts, these loan programs in practice have a large
additional subsidy because of the chronic practice of forgiving unpaid
debts as part of “amnesty” programs when weather or other conditions
result in large losses (see Fearnside 2001a). In addition to Brazilian
government subsidies, international funds have similar effects.
Particularly controversial was a second loan from the World Bank Group’s
International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2004 to the André Maggi Group
for soybeans in Mato Grosso (e.g., Stickler et al. 2005). The loan was
classified as “Category B” by the IFC, meaning that it was not expected to
result in environmental impact and was exempted from environmental review
procedures within the Bank. The IFC’s own auditing concluded that the
“Category B” classification was unwarranted and recommended measures to
avoid similar errors (IFC, CAO 2005). However, in 2007, the IFC granted a
major loan to the Bertin Group for slaughterhouses in Pará under almost
identical circumstances (Folha de São Paulo (FSP) 2007). All of these
subsidies need to be ended.

Establish the Rule of Law

Complete a cadaster of land
titles

Associating clearings observed from satellites with
specific landowners requires a cadaster, or register, of properties with
georeferenced boundaries. Such a cadaster has long been an official goal
of INCRA, but successive delays and budget cuts have prevented reaching
the goal anywhere in the region. The decentralized system of document
depositories (“cartorios”) in Brazil is particularly susceptible to
corruption and to maintenance of conflicting, overlapping, and
incompletely described landholdings. The surge in deforestation in late
2007 provoked an announcement that the cadaster will be completed first
for properties >250 ha in area in the 36 municipalities that accounted
for most of the clearing surge (Brazil, INCRA 2008).

Reinforce command and
control

Command-and-control operations can restrain
deforestation through licensing and repression. Skepticism regarding the
government’s ability to control deforestation is frequent due to the long
history of “packages” of government measures being announced whenever
satellite data are released indicating an increase in deforestation, after
which the deforestation rate may increase or not with no perceptible
effect resulting from the repression program. This skepticism among
Brazilian negotiators of agreements under the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change has been at the root of the country’s traditional refusal
to consider carbon credit for avoided deforestation, the fear being that
if Brazil commits itself to reducing deforestation by a specific amount
and then fails to do so, the country could be subject to pressures that
would jeopardize its sovereignty over Amazonia (see Fearnside 2001d,
Fearnside and Barbosa 2003). The example of the Mato Grosso state
government’s deforestation and licensing program from 1999 to 2001, when a
measurable reduction in deforestation could be attributed to the program,
serves as an important example for this reason (Fearnside
2003).

Illegal logging has proved to be more difficult to control
than deforestation. This situation may improve in the future due to recent
advances in satellite detection of logging disturbance (Asner et al.
2006), plus administrative advances in replacing easily forged or
corrupted documentation. Nevertheless, the high monetary value and the
ephemeral nature of logging activity make control measures inherently easy
to corrupt. Certification of “sustainable” forest management operations
has potential, but these operations cannot be economically competitive
unless illegal “predatory” logging can be stopped. In 1997, Brazil’s
Secretariat of Strategic Affairs estimated that 80% of logging in
Brazilian Amazonia was illegal (Brazil, Secretaria de Assuntos
Estratégicas (SAE) 1997, cited by Greenpeace 2001). Subsequently, a series
of provisions made it easier to “legalize” the extracted timber, such that
an estimated 75% of the timber had some sort of documentation by 2002, but
virtually all of this wood remained just as predatory in its origins (John
2002).

Discourage
Movement to Frontier

Exercise restraint in approving
infrastructure

Restraint must be exercised in approving and
building infrastructure that has a high potential to spread deforestation
(Fearnside 2002, Laurance et al. 2001). Roads are the principal factor
leading to movement of population and to increased land prices and
consequent land speculation (in addition to increased agricultural
profitability). Economic analyses indicate that decreasing the transport
costs from Amazonia to the rest of Brazil is one of the factors that has
the greatest effect on increasing deforestation (Cattaneo 2001). Since
1986, an Environmental Impact Study (EIA) and associated Report on Impact
on the Environment (RIMA), jointly known as the “EIA/RIMA,” have been
required for infrastructure projects, despite a variety of cases where
project proponents have managed to circumvent the requirement. The
EIA/RIMA has a potentially important role to play in restraining the
construction of particularly damaging infrastructure projects. However,
the EIA/RIMA has so far been restricted to legitimizing decisions on
infrastructure that have, in fact, been made before the studies are
undertaken. In addition, the EIA/RIMA restricts itself to direct effects,
such as the roadbed of a highway, rather than the much more important
effects of deforestation stimulated by the road in the surrounding area
(e.g., Fearnside 2007). The system of contracting the studies by project
proponents also involves obvious biases in favor of whatever project is
proposed (e.g., Fearnside and Barbosa 1996). The system must be
strengthened such that the full impact of the proposed projects is
assessed and compared with other alternatives (including no-project
alternatives) before decisions are made.

Create and protect conservation
units

Protected areas, including indigenous areas, have a
significant effect on deforestation (e.g., Schwartzman et al. 2000,
Ferreira et al. 2005, Nepstad et al. 2006). This last category, which has
so far been the most widely applied, is currently under threat from a
proposed law in the National Congress that would remove authority from the
Ministry of the Environment and from the President to create new protected
areas, and require approval by the National Congress for any new reserves.
This proposal of the “Ruralist block” (a voting block of representatives
of large landholders) would effectively end any further expansion of
Brazil’s protected-areas network.

Create Economic Alternative

Create employment in source areas and
alternative destinations

Employment opportunities are needed
for potential migrants in source areas and in alternative destinations,
including urban centers. This is important for poor migrants, such as
those coming from Maranhão. It should not be confused with facilitating
the investments of wealthy entrepreneurs (Fearnside 1989b). It is
important to remember also that, although alternatives in source areas
(including agrarian reform) are important and deserve continual government
support, ending the regularization of invasions by landless migrants in
Amazonia cannot be held hostage to eliminating poverty in the rest of
Brazil.

Support
sustainable uses

Maintaining population in the forest
requires implantation and regulation of sustainable uses of standing
tropical forest, including “extractivism” of non-timber forest products
such as rubber and Brazil nuts, and forest management for timber.
Certification efforts are an important part of these efforts.

Support alternative supply of
domestic markets

National markets for food and fiber must
have sources of supply that do not require cutting Amazonian forest. Wood
in particular must eventually be supplied from plantations for all uses
that do not require particular species from native forest (i.e., musical
instruments, etc.). Of all of the countries in the world, Brazil consumes
the largest amount of tropical forest wood, totaling 34 million
m3 of logs in 1997 (Smeraldi and Veríssimo 1999). Only 5% of
the harvested tropical forest wood is exported, the rest being used
domestically (Smeraldi and Veríssimo 1999). Brazil’s large areas of
silvicultural plantations are used almost exclusively for pulp and
charcoal, not for solid wood (Fearnside 1998). A transition to plantation
sources will require closing off the supply of cheap timber from Amazonian
forests.

The distinction between national and international markets
is essential. The Brazilian government has a certain responsibility to
supply the country’s population with products such as food, wood,
electricity, and minerals. However, Brazil has no obligation to supply
these products to any other country. Whether Brazil exports products with
environmental impacts represents a national decision in which the country
is free to pick and choose among various possible export products based on
its own interests. Products with strong environmental impacts include
tropical timber, aluminum (which motivates much of Brazil’s rush to build
hydroelectric dams), and potentially biofuels. Brazil and Amazonia are not
a vast storehouse from which the world is free to obtain whatever it might
want to buy (e.g., Fearnside 1989c, 2006). A decision of this type has
been taken in the case of mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla), for
which a harvesting moratorium is in effect in recognition of the
environmental damage that exploiting this species inflicts on the forest.
Countries that want to buy mahogany can obtain it in Bolivia or elsewhere,
but not legally from Brazil. The same principle could be applied to a
variety of other highly damaging products.

Reward environmental services

The
environmental services of the forest include avoiding global warming,
maintaining the hydrological cycle, and maintaining biodiversity. These
have much greater value to society than does what is obtained by
destroying the forest to sell timber, plant cattle pasture, etc. Creating
institutional mechanisms to translate this value into monetary flows that
sustain both the region’s rural population and the forest is the primary
challenge facing efforts to create an alternative economy of the magnitude
needed (Fearnside 1997). Although continuous progress has been made in the
over two decades since this author proposed such a transition, the forces
driving forest destruction have advanced tremendously. Examples of schemes
for direct payments for environmental services to private landholders in
tropical countries outside of Amazonia illustrate the difficulties
involved in balancing social and environmental goals (e.g., Grieg-Gran et
al. 2005, Karousakis 2007, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). An incipient
initiative in Brazil’s state of Amazonas (Viana and Campos 2007) needs to
be carefully watched to ensure that its carbon benefits are real and that
a variety of potential negative side effects are avoided (Fearnside 2008).
It is essential that such limited payment for environmental services
programs functions properly as a prelude to larger monetary flows that
could be generated through international negotiations such as those under
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC has
progressed the furthest toward rewarding environmental services, in this
case the carbon storage functions of the forest, but other environmental
services are equally valuable and must eventually be rewarded.

CONCLUSIONS
The impact on
deforestation of actors and their movements in Brazilian Amazonia depends
greatly on the actors involved. Cattle ranching predominates in deforested
areas, allowing a small human population to have a large impact on
clearing. The effects are large and rapid when movements are of actors
such as “grileiros,” sawmill owners, and ranchers with illicit income
sources. Other actors include capitalized farmers who invest in legitimate
agriculture, and a number of types of poor migrants, including goldminers,
laborers, colonists, and squatters. Limiting deforestation will require
measures that affect all of these diverse groups.

Removing the
motives for deforestation will require a stop to regularizing land claims,
as well as cutting the various subsidies through which Brazilian taxpayers
still contribute to the profitability of clearing. Controlling
deforestation requires establishment of the rule of law throughout
Amazonia, including a complete cadaster, or register, of land titles and
reinforcement of command-and-control programs. Movement to the frontier
must be discouraged by exercising restraint in approving infrastructure
projects, especially for highways, and by creating and protecting
conservation units. At the same time, economic alternatives must be
created by generating employment in source areas and in alternative
destinations, by supporting sustainable uses of the forest and alternative
supply of national markets for products such as wood. Most fundamental is
continued progress in creating mechanisms to reward the environmental
services of standing forest as an alternative foundation for the economy
in rural Amazonia.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Paper presented at the Symposium on "The influence of human
demography and agriculture on natural systems in the Neotropics,"
Association for Tropical Biology and Conservation 2007 Annual Meeting,
Morelia, Michoacán, Mexico, 15–19 July 2007, with travel funding from NSF
(DEB-0731594). The Conselho Nacional do Desenvolvimento Científico e
Tecnológico (CNPq: Proc. 306031/2004-3, 474548/2006-6, 557152/2005-4,
420199/2005-5), Rede GEOMA, and the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da
Amazônia (INPA: PPI PRJ05.57) contributed financial support. E. H. Keizer
produced the figures. M. Aide, R. Grau, L. Gunderson, and three anonymous
reviewers made valuable comments on the manuscript.

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Address of
Correspondent:
Philip M. Fearnside
INPA
C.P.
478
69.011-970 Manaus-Amazonas
Brazil
[email-masked]

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