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# Bolivia's political transition and COP30

**Flora Magdaline Benítez Romero<sup>1,2</sup> and Philip Martin Fearnside<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Universidad Amazónica de Pando, Cobija, Pando, Bolivia. <sup>2</sup>National Institute for Amazonian Research (INPA), Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil. Email: pmfearn@inpa.gov.br

Bolivia's new president, Rodrigo Paz Pereira, took office on 8 November 2025. He has promised to prioritize rebuilding the country by bridging regional, political, and social divisions to build a long-term vision for the country. This political transition is timely in that it also adds a new dimension to Bolivia's position at the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), which takes place this week in Brazil (1).

At COP30, Bolivia will discuss *its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (2026–2035)* (2), which was submitted in September 2025 (3). The plan sets ambitious climate targets across the country's forest, energy, water, agriculture, and waste sectors. Achieving the plan's goals, however, is highly dependent on international cooperation and financing (2). We suggest Involvement of the Indigenous Native Peasant Autonomous Governments to implement non-market cooperative mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, where developed nations provide grant-based financial support, technology transfer, and capacity-building rather than carbon-credit trading. Such cooperation could be channeled through the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and bilateral partnerships with parties such as Germany and the European Union, which have already supported reforestation and integrated water-management projects in the Amazon region (4). These initiatives align with Bolivia's long-standing advocacy for non-market approaches that prioritize social justice, transparency, and local empowerment over offset-based carbon markets.

Rural communities, including Indigenous peoples, are the main stewards of Bolivia's ecosystems. By increasing consultation with Bolivia's Indigenous Native Peasant Autonomous Governments, for example, improvements in managing local forest resources, community water systems, and fire-prevention networks could be achieved, reinforcing ecosystem resilience and food security at the local level. Unfortunately, rural residents are often ignored or even penalized when it comes to land-use issues. For example, some communities have been sanctioned (5) for opening small subsistence plots (*chacos*) of 1 to 3 hectares, which are essential for food security (6). This is in stark contrast to large forest concession holders, who each control between 50 000 to 200 000 hectares (7). The vast majority have not conducted the legally required forest management audits since 1996 (3,4).

Notably, nearly 70% of Bolivia's land area is part of the Amazon Basin, the source of rivers that flow to the Amazon River, and about 7% of the Amazon rainforest lies in Bolivia (8). This setting reinforces Bolivia's constitutionally mandated defense of the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, which was established in 2010. Bolivia's new leadership must reconcile the fact

that although this law is central to the updated Nationally Determined Contribution plan, the country has allowed increases in mining activities, large hydroelectricity projects, oil and gas exploitation, and large-scale agriculture.

As Bolivia begins a political transition, the country is poised to strengthen its climate policies. It can begin by committing to the Amazonian agenda set forth at COP30.

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